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ABSTRACT
There is a myth that shadowy and powerful government
agencies can crack the encryption software that criminals use to protect
computers filled with child pornography and stolen credit card
numbers. The reality is that cheap or free encryption programs can
place protected data beyond law enforcement's reach. If courts seriously
mean to protect the victims of Internet crime-all too often
children-then Congress must adopt a legal mechanism to remedy the
technological deficiency.
To date, police and prosecutors have relied on subpoenas to
either compel defendants to produce their password, or to decipher
their protected data. This technique has been met with mixed success.
A better solution would be to couple a subpoena for the
deciphered data with a warrant that specifies what and how to search.
If the defendant refuses to produce the deciphered data, he can be held
in contempt.
Where handing over protected data means the certainty of a
lengthy prison sentence, some defendants will prefer contempt to
compliance. Therefore, the court needs an additional legal mechanism
to allow fact-finders to look into protected data. This Article proposes
that when a defendant refuses to comply with a court order to produce
deciphered data, the court should be able to issue a missing evidence
instruction as a surrogate for actual inspection. If a warrant, a
subpoena, and a contempt order cannot induce a defendant to decrypt
©0 2011 John E. D. Larkin graduated from Oberlin College and the Villanova
University School of Law. He is an Assistant District Attorney, specializing in Appeals, at the
Montgomery County District Attorney's Office. He worked on the analysis of the compelled
disclosure issue in Commonwealth v. Hurst, discussed infra.
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his data, courts should issue an instruction that the fact-finder may
presume that the missing data is incriminating.
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Crime is going digital.' Child pornography in particular has
drawn national attention to Internet crime, 2 but it is hardly unique;
wire fraud has turned into email scams, 3 robbery has evolved into
"war-driving,"4 and harassment has become cyber-bullying.5 Building
a case against suspected online criminals has the potential to be
1. "Internet expansion has fostered new kinds of crimes, additional means to commit
existing crimes and increased complexities of prosecuting crimes." Shannon L. Hopkins,
Cybercrime Convention: A Positive Beginning to a Long Road Ahead, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 101,
101 (2003).
2. "[Sluch things as 'sexting,' the sharing of sexually explicit photos, and the use of
webcams for sexual interactions make headlines in connection with child pornography,
pedophilia, and concerns about early teenage sexuality . . . ." Katherine J. Strandburg, Home,
Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technological Change, 70 MD. L.
REV. 614, 624 (2011).
3. See generally Lauren D. Lunsford, Note, Fraud, Fools, and Phishing: Mail Fraud
and the Person of Ordinary Prudence in the Internet Age, 99 KY. L.J. 379 (2011) (examining the
application of wire and mail fraud statutes in the digital age).
4. Sarah Jane Hughes, Payments Data Security Breaches and Oil Spills: What Lessons
Can Payments Security Learn from the Laws Governing Remediation of the Exxon Valdez,
Deepwater Horizon, and Other Oil Spills?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 111, 132 (2010)
(describing "war driving" as a method by which cybercriminals search for unencrypted data to
intercept from moving vehicles).
5. John E. D. Larkin, Criminal and Civil Liability for User Generated Content:
Craigslist, A Case Study, 15 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 85, 86 (2010) (describing Margery
Tannenbaum's conviction for harassment through Craigslist's casual encounters forum).
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relatively simple: Their own computers become a treasure trove of
incriminating photographs, emails, documents, and programs.6
In 2011, the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office
prosecuted a case that was not so simple. In Commonwealth v. Hurst,
county prosecutors charged the defendant-a vice principal at a local
elementary school-with carrying on an inappropriate relationship
with one of his minor students.' As a part of this relationship, the
victim claimed that the defendant sent him inappropriate text
messages;8 the victim substantiated this claim by handing over his
own phone, which included dozens of inappropriate text messages
from the defendant.9 Hurst purported to explain the texts by telling
the police that a virus had infected his phone.10 As a demonstration of
his ostensible good faith, he handed the phone over to the police
voluntarily." However, the phone was encrypted and the defendant
refused to tell the police his password. 12
As a matter of course, the government was interested in
searching Hurst's cell phone. Doing so could connect the defendant to
the messages sent to the victim and provide the necessary evidence to
refute his claim that the texts were sent by a virus (or substantiate it
and end the prosecution). 13 This posed the question-one of first
impression in Pennsylvania (and most other jurisdictions)--under
what circumstances can the government view encrypted data and
using what procedural mechanisms?
Charles Hurst ultimately pled guilty, obviating the need for
Pennsylvania courts to wrestle with this question.14 The day when an
answer will be needed, however, is fast approaching.15
6. Rachel Kathleen Gernat, Avoiding the Pitfalls of Prosecuting Internet Crimes
Against Children, in STRATEGIES FOR PROSECUTING INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY CASES: LEADING
PROSECUTORS ON INTERVIEWING THE SUSPECT, DEVELOPING A TRIAL STRATEGY, AND
NEGOTIATING THE CHARGES 1, 2 (Aspatore 2008) (describing some of the unique challenges and
opportunities that cybercrime poses to prosecutors)
7. See Regina Medina, Educator Accused of Sexting Teen, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sep. 25,
2010, http://articles.philly.com/2010-09-25/news/24977846.
8. Id.
9. Carl Hessler Jr., Phone Battle Wages On in Former NP Vice Principal Charles






14. Matt Coughlin, Frmr Vice Principal Pleads Guilty to Corrupting Boys,
PHILLYBURBS.COM (Mar 16, 2011, 3:03 PM), http://www.phillyburbs.com/news/crime/frmr-vice-
principal-pleads-guilty-to-corrupting-boys/article a7669caa-5000-11 eO-bdf5-0017a4a78c22.html.
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A few courts in other jurisdictions have considered the question
of whether and under what circumstances the police can search an
encrypted computer or device, 16 and a small body of academic
literature has begun exploring those decisions and their
ramifications.1 7 Thus far, academia has universally acknowledged
that "as criminal activity becomes more sophisticated through the use
of computer technology, it is reasonable to conclude that government
agents charged with fighting computer crime should be given some
latitude and discretion in how to confront these complicated
matters."18 Beyond this broad statement there is little consensus.19
Michael Smith, for instance, proposes that courts treat
computers like locked containers for Fourth Amendment purposes. 20
On the other hand, Nathan McGregor notes that encrypted data is
clearly distinguishable from the contents of a locked container because
it is "scrambled."21 He states that compelling defendants to
"unscramble" encrypted data flirts with violating the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. 22 David Colarusso agrees that encrypted
data presents Fifth Amendment concerns but declines to opine as to
how courts will-or should-resolve the matter. 23
This Article proceeds in three sections. First, it considers the
Fourth Amendment requirements for a constitutional search of a
password-protected device. Next, where encryption makes a search
impossible, this Article considers the Fifth Amendment ramifications
15. See generally David Colarusso, Note, Heads in the Cloud, A Coming Storm the
Interplay of Cloud Computing, Encryption, and the Fifth Ameadment's Protection Against
Self-Incrimination, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 69, 100 (2011).
16. See In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); see
also United States v. Kirschner, No. 09-MC-50872, 2010 WL 1257355, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30,
2010).
17. Nathan K. McGregor, Note, The Weak Protection of Strong Encryption: Passwords,
Privacy, and Fifth Amendment Privilege, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 581, 602-03 (2010); see,
e.g., Colarusso, supra note 15, at 73; see also Andrew J. Ungberg, Note, Protecting Privacy
Through a Responsible Decryption Policy, 22 HARV J.L. & TECH. 537, 539 (2009).
18. Michael Smith, Survey, The Fourth Amendment, Password-Protected Computer
Files and Third Party Consent Searches: The Tenth Circuit Broadens the Scope of Warrantless
Searches, 85 DENv. U. L. REV. 701, 724 (2008).
19. Colarusso, supra note 15, at 100; McGregor, supra note 17, at 602-03; see, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 18, at 724.
20. Smith, supra note 18, at 723.
21. McGregor, supra note 17, at 602-03.
22. Id. McGregor explains that encryption is inherently different from physical
protections like locked briefcases. Id. This is so, he argues, because a locked briefcase protects
the documents within without altering them; encryption, on the other hand, replaces the
protected data with a new scrambled version. Id. As such, he argues, compelling defendants to
unscramble their data requires them to create a new and inculpatory document. Id.
23. Colarusso, supra note 15, at 100. Instead, Mr. Colarusso, perhaps wisely, concludes
that "[a]ll that is certain is this: a storm is coming." Id.
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of compelling a defendant to reveal his password or produce a
deciphered copy of his protected data. This Article then considers
situations in which defendants may refuse to comply with court orders
that compel them to hand over incriminating data. This Article
concludes by suggesting that courts can give a missing evidence
instruction where the defendant is in sole control of the encrypted
data and refuses to comply with a court order to produce a deciphered
copy.
I. ELECTRONIC DEVICES ARE SUBJECT TO UNIQUE FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Today, easily obtainable encryption software products can
protect data so effectively that many branches of law enforcement
cannot decipher the encrypted data.2 4  This poses a significant
practical problem for police who wish to bypass a defendant's
password to search his computer without consent. Techniques are
available, however, that law enforcement officers can use to access
protected data. For instance, where the password is only a few
characters long, a computer can sequentially try each possible
combination of letters or numbers until it reaches the correct
password.2 5  In addition, some popular devices have well-known
security flaws built into their operating codes that law enforcement
can exploit to reach protected data. 26 And even an unbreakable
encryption regime on a secure device can be defeated if the defendant's
password is easy to guess; for example, Charles Hurst protected his
phone with his birth date.27
In the Hurst case, the defendant made it clear that he was
unwilling to provide the Commonwealth with the password to his
phone under any circumstances and that he intended to take his case
24. Id. at 77. "Modern innovations, however, have resulted in the creation of encryption
schemes so difficult to break that practical considerations render them effectively unbreakable.
Given the power of today's computers, it could take longer to break such encryption than there
are years left in the universe." Id. (footnote omitted).
25. Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone
from a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1164 (2011). There are only 10,000
possible combinations of four numbers, for instance. Id. For instance, a four digit numerical
password-like an ATM PIN-can be deciphered in minutes by a computer that sequentially
tries each possible combination. Id.
26. Id.
27. Carl Hessler Jr., Update: Former North Penn Vice Principal Charles Hurst Cell
Phone Password Obtained, MONTGOMERY NEWS (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.montgomerynews.
com/articles/2011/03/03/north penn life/news/doc4d6fa74747db3944451459.txt.
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to trial.28 However, once a cooperating witness provided the password,
the defendant decided to accept a plea bargain. 29
The outcome of the Hurst case demonstrates the importance of
protected data in such cases. The inappropriate text messages that
the police recovered from Hurst's phone were powerful evidence
against him. Nevertheless, their evidentiary value was, in some
respects, marginal: Had the Commonwealth been unable to decrypt
the cell phone, it could have offered the text messages that the victim
received. The fact that Hurst predicated his decision to plead guilty,
at least in part, on this marginally valuable evidence underscores the
fact that, in some cases, the decryption of protected data will itself
determine the outcome of the trial.
For instance, the government may receive information from a
defendant's Internet Service Provider that he recently downloaded an
image that depicts child pornography. 30 This evidence, without more,
is strongly indicative that the defendant is guilty of violating the
federal child-pornography statute.3 ' If the image that the government
knows about is encrypted-particularly in cases where investigation
would reveal additional illegal images-the defendant may prefer to
refuse a court order to decipher his hard drive and accept
imprisonment for criminal contempt (in addition to a conviction for a
single count of child pornography), rather than expose himself to
convictions for hundreds of illegal images.
In short, encryption places protected data beyond the reach of
law enforcement; even where courts order the defendant to hand over
his password or a copy of the deciphered data, noncompliance may
shut the door on effective prosecution. This reality suggests a need to
create an alteinative and more effective method for courts to compel
defendants to disclose the contents of encrypted devices. Any such
procedure, however, would self-evidently be subject to the rigorous
requirements of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
28. Id.
29. Id.; Coughlin, supra note 14.
30. Most Internet Service Providers routinely monitor the content of emails by
searching for specific files that have already been identified as containing child pornography.
Steven R. Morrison, What the Cops Can't Do, Internet Service Providers Can: Preserving Privacy
in Email Contents, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 253, 265 n.68 (2011). When the service provider detects
these files being sent, it contacts law enforcement. Id.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006).
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A. Searching Electronic Devices
Searching electronic devices, regardless of whether they are
password protected, poses unique Fourth Amendment problems. In
any context, warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 32 Searches pursuant to a warrant are
only valid where the warrant is based on probable cause that evidence
of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. 33 Additionally, the
warrant must describe with sufficient particularity the place(s) to be
searched and the item(s) to be seized. 34
The particularity requirement is aimed at preventing "general,
exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." 35 "This requirement
'makes general searches . .. impossible and prevents the seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant."' 3 6
Where a search warrant directs the police to seize a tangible object at
a particular location, the search protocol is straightforward: The police
may search inside closed containers that, by virtue of their size or
shape, could contain the sought after contraband. 37  A limited
exception to this protocol-the plain view doctrine-permits officers to
seize evidence found in the open during an otherwise lawful search,
even if the original search warrant did not contemplate the seized
contraband. 38
Unfortunately, computer searches are less straightforward for
Fourth Amendment purposes. The metadata associated with
computer files (like the files' names, dates of creation and
modification, and file types) can be altered or misleading. 39 Thus,
because the contents of a computer file cannot be determined without
opening it, every computer search risks transforming into a general
32. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . .
see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 n.6 (1983).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("Warrants shall issue ... particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,
557 (2004).
35. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
36. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (alteration in original) (quoting
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. United States v. McLevain, 310 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding search under
a bed and in a garage to be objectively reasonable pursuant to a search warrant for a fugitive
because a person could hide in these locations).
38. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 142 (1990).
39. United States v. Tillotson, No. 2:08-CR-33, 2008 WL 5140773, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Dec.
2, 2008) ("Data can be obscured or hidden by placing it in files with misleading names, or even in
files that suggest the contents are something completely different from what they actually are.").
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search.4 0 Moreover, because computer data is never in "view" in the
same way as tangible evidence, the application of the plain view
doctrine is uncertain in the electronic context. 41  This danger is
compounded by the fact that most computers contain sensitive data, 4 2
such as medical records, wills and trusts documents, business emails,
and confidential communications with attorneys. 4 3
The US Supreme Court has not yet addressed this question,
and the circuit courts have adopted varying strategies to cope with
this reality. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has done
the most to protect individual privacy, and in a concurring opinion by
Chief Judge Kozinski, suggests that:
[T]he warrant application should normally include, or the issuing judicial officer should
insert, a protocol for preventing agents involved in the investigation from examining or
retaining any data other than that for which probable cause is shown. The procedure
might involve, as in this case, a requirement that the segregation be done by specially
trained computer personnel who are not involved in the investigation. In that case, it
should be made clear that only those personnel may examine and segregate the data.
The government should also agree that such computer personnel will not communicate
any information they learn during the segregation process absent further approval of
the court.
Once the data has been segregated (and, if necessary, redacted), the government agents
involved in the investigation should be allowed to examine only the information covered
by the terms of the warrant. Absent further judicial authorization, any remaining
copies should be destroyed or, at least so long as they may be lawfully possessed by the
party from whom they were seized, returned along with the actual physical medium
that may have been seized (such as a hard drive or computer). The government should
not retain copies of such returned data unless it obtains specific judicial authorization to
do so.44
Judge Kozinski would require police officers to include a search
protocol in their application for a warrant to search a seized
40. Id. ("Recalling that pornography could be located in files with misleading names,
authorizing a search of all files on the computer was as specific as the warrant could be under
the circumstances.").
41. Andrew Vahid Moshirnia, Note, Separating Hard Fact from Hard Drive: A Solution
for Plain View Doctrine in the Digital Domain, 23 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 609, 619 (2010); Bryan K.
Weir, Note, It's (Not So) Plain to See: The Circuit Split on the Plain View Doctrine in Digital
Searches, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 83 (2010). See generally James Saylor, Note, Computers as
Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital
Searches, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2809 (2011).
42. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
551-52 (2005) ("A computer is akin to a virtual warehouse of private information . . . .").
43. Grubb v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 730 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
(involving an employee's laptop, which contained "personal and sensitive information, as well as
testing data and private patient information").
44. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1179 (9th Cir.
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
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computer. 45 Courts in the Second Circuit 4 6 and the Eighth Circuit 47
have rejected Judge Kozinski's search protocol as a per se
requirement, but have nevertheless expressed approval of the
procedure.48
One court in the Sixth Circuit, however, has rejected the use of
such protocols altogether. Specifically, the US District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee has observed that "[t]he warrant
process is primarily concerned with identifying what may be searched
or seized-not how-and whether there is sufficient cause for the
invasion of privacy thus entailed."49  On this basis, the Court
concluded that "when the search warrant permits the agents to search
a computer, they may search all of the files in that computer for the
items to be seized."50
The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,51 has charted a
middle path, and the US Courts of Appeals for the Third,52 Fifth,53
Seventh,54 and Eleventh Circuits have joined it.66 Each of these courts
rejects the Ninth Circuit's suggestion that a search protocol must be
attached to every warrant application.56 However, they also do not
45. Id.
46. United States v. Dupree, 781 F. Supp. 2d 115, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Although the
government is not required to include in its application for a search warrant a search protocol,
enumerating the methods that the government might use to search computers, where the
government does so, courts have found the warrant sufficiently particular.").
47. United States v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442, 447-48 (8th Cir. 2008) ("While we
acknowledge that there may be times that a search methodology or strategy may be useful or
necessary, we decline to make a blanket finding that the absence of a search methodology or
strategy renders a search warrant invalid per se.").
48. Id.; Dupree, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
49. United States v. Kernell, No. 308-CR-142, 2010 WL 1491873, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Mar.
31, 2010) (quoting United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
50. Id. (citing United States v. Ogden, No. 06-20033-STA, 2008 WL 4982756, at *3
(W.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2008)).
51. United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 2005).
52. United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2011).
53. United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 947 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
54. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2010) ("We are also skeptical
of a rule requiring officers to always obtain pre-approval from a magistrate judge to use the
electronic tools necessary to conduct searches tailored to uncovering evidence that is responsive
to a properly circumscribed warrant. Instead, we simply counsel officers and others involved in
searches of digital media to exercise caution to ensure that warrants describe with particularity
the things to be seized and that searches are narrowly tailored to uncover only those things
described."), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525 (2010).
55. United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2007).
56. See, e.g., Brooks, 427 F.3d at 1251 ("This court has never required warrants to
contain a particularized computer search strategy.").
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accept the conclusion that a warrant to search a computer grants carte
blanche to view every file.5 7
Instead, the Tenth Circuit has directed searching officers to
attempt, where feasible, to sort files into a set of relevant and
irrelevant documents (or pictures, spreadsheets, videos, or music files)
before opening them.58 Having done so, the officer is afforded broad
discretion to search the relevant data; the reviewing magistrate then
considers the reasonableness of the search by examining "(1) the
object of the search, (2) the types of files that may reasonably contain
those objects, and (3) whether officers actually expand the scope of the
search upon locating evidence of a different crime."5 9
The Third Circuit takes a similar approach and directs
searching officers to employ "search methods such as focusing on the
file type identified in the warrant, file names, keyword search, and
directory structure."60 In the Fifth Circuit, the US District Court for
the Southern District of Texas takes this a step further and urges law
enforcement to exclude files from searches based on metadata that
contraindicates relevance; for example, officers should not open files
created long before the date of the crime being investigated. 61 The
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits decline to identify specific factors they
will consider when reviewing a warrant application but have
expressed support for the use of sorting and keyword searching. 62
B. Searching Electronic Devices that Have Been Encrypted or
Password Protected
Where defendants have password protected or encrypted their
electronic devices, this protection poses Fourth Amendment, as well as
technological, challenges for law enforcement.
57. Id. ("Recognizing the difficulties inherent in computer searches, in some
circumstances, we have suggested that 'law enforcement must engage in the intermediate step of
sorting various types of documents and then only search the ones specified in a warrant."'
(quoting United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999))).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1252.
60. United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 239 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Carey, 172 F.3d at
1276).
61. United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 947 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
62. United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Agent Scott
Skinner testified that agents used 'keyword searches,' and 'if a document was opened and it
wasn't . .. covered by the warrant, then it wasn't analyzed.' Khanani and Portlock fail to cite any
binding case law that would lead us to conclude the procedures used in this case infringed
defendants' Fourth Amendment rights." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also
United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525 (2010).
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For instance, in the Hurst case, the defendant voluntarily
provided his cell phone to police. 63 On the one hand, by consensually
handing over his cell phone, Hurst arguably forfeited his right to
privacy in the data contained within. 64 Nevertheless, the fact that
Hurst consented to the police possessing and inspecting the phone
does not necessarily mean he specifically consented to a search of the
phone's password-protected contents.65 On the other hand, by handing
over a password-protected device and refusing to provide the
password, the defendant arguably declined consent to search the data
on his phone.
In this way, password-protected devices, like Hurst's cell
phone, pose two serious obstacles to searches. First, they may be
impossible to decrypt without assistance from the defendant.66
Moreover, when police can hack or guess the password, complying
with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment may be challenging;
just finding the appropriate software and hardware to enable a
forensic search of obsolete or uncommon devices may be difficult or
impossible, making conformity to the Ninth Circuit's particularity
requirements a daunting task.67
This, however, is not a new challenge-courts have long been
faced with instances where the nature of the needed evidence makes
constitutionally permissible searches difficult. 68 Typically, in response
to this challenge, courts require defendants to produce the
sought-after information via a subpoena duces tecuM. 6 9  This
procedure avoids the danger that police will read irrelevant private
information and neatly skirts many of the Fourth Amendment issues
63. Hessler, supra note 9.
64. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (stating that consent is an
exception to both warrant and probable cause requirements).
65. United States v. Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 534 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[A] suspect's general,
blanket consent to search a given area or item, by itself, would not likely permit officers to break
into a locked container located within the area being searched.").
66. Ungberg, supra note 17, at 541 ("The primary problem for law enforcement is the
fact that modern encryption software is extremely difficult to break. For example, a brute-force
attack on the widely available PGP encryption suite could take billions of years. Furthermore,
the underlying algorithms are incredibly complex, and 'solving' them is far beyond realistic
capabilities of law enforcement. Practically speaking, encryption today is impenetrable insofar as
it cannot be bypassed by available means within a reasonable amount of time." (footnotes
omitted)).
67. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 49, 60 (2009) (describing multiple hardware standards).
68. See In re Establishment Inspection of Skil Corp., 846 F.2d 1127, 1133 (7th Cir.
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explored above. 70 It does, however, raise Fifth Amendment concerns,
as discussed below.71
II. COMPELLING DEFENDANTS TO SURRENDER THEIR PASSWORDS POSES
SERIOUS OBSTACLES IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT CONTEXT
As noted above, searching a computer or electronic device
without the owner's permission may be difficult or impossible in cases
where he has encrypted the sought-after data. 72  Because the
government can compel defendants to produce incriminating
documents-so long as their creation was not compelled-one solution
to this problem is for the court to order the defendant to decrypt the
protected device. Decisions from the US Supreme Court, however, as
well as recent case law from district courts in Michigan and Vermont,
suggest that the answer is not that simple.
A. Historical Jurisprudence
The Fifth Amendment protects defendants from the compelled
production of incriminating testimony or evidence. 73 The definition of
incriminating evidence includes otherwise innocuous information that
can lead investigators to proof of guilt.74
Additionally, this privilege extends further than statements
that tend to incriminate the speaker; the act of production itself can be
privileged under the Fifth Amendment.75 If the mere act of production
can "implicitly communicate incriminating facts, such as the
admission that 'papers existed, were in [the] produc[ing] party's
possession or control, and were authentic,"' the court cannot compel
production without complex safeguards. 76
70. Thomas Kiefer Wedeles, Note, Fishing for Clarity in A Post-Hubbell World: The
Need for a Bright-Line Rule in the Self-Incrimination Clause's Act of Production Doctrine, 56
VAND. L. REV. 613, 619 (2003) ("[A] subpoena will be less disruptive to the third party's
operations than a search warrant.").
71. See discussion infra Part II.
72. Ungberg, supra note 17, at 541.
73. Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (citing United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984)).
74. Commonwealth v. Rickabaugh, 633 A.2d 647, 648 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hawthorne, 236 A.2d 519, 519 (Pa. 1968)).
75. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 391 (1976); see, e.g., In re Search Warrant
B-21778, 521 A.2d 422, 428 (Pa. 1987); see also Andreson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 463 (1976).
76. SEC v. Ryan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 355, 363 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Cianciulli, No. M18304 (RMBTHK), 2002 WL 1484396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July, 10, 2002)); see also
United States v. O'Shea, 662 F. Supp. 2d 535, 544 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) ("The act of production
doctrine permits individuals to resist the government's attempts to compel the individual to
hand over documents in certain circumstances. According to this doctrine, the Self-Incrimination
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On the other hand, the "Fifth Amendment has consistently
been held to exclude only evidence which is testimonial in nature."7
"Testimonial evidence is communicative evidence as distinguished
from demonstrative or physical evidence."78 In order to be testimonial,
"an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate
a factual assertion or disclose information."7 9
Moreover, so long as the act of production doctrine is not a bar,
courts and prosecuting authorities may subpoena defendants to
produce incriminating evidence so long as its creation is not
compelled.80 In other words, prosecutors can compel defendants to
produce the contents of personal or business records to be used as
substantive evidence of the guilt of their author, in spite of the
prohibition against self-incrimination. 81 This well-settled principle is
known as the Fisher doctrine. 82
For instance, in Doe v. United States (Doe II), the defendant
was called before a grand jury to testify about possible federal offenses
relating to unreported income.83 The grand jury issued a subpoena
requiring him to produce records of transactions at three banks in the
Cayman Islands and Bermuda, but the defendant, citing his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, refused to comply.
In an attempt to circumvent the issue, the federal prosecutors
subpoenaed the records directly from the foreign banks. 84 The banks,
however, claimed that local regulations prevented them from releasing
records without the signed consent of an authorized account holder.85
The government then tried to subpoena the signed consent forms from
the defendant who, again, invoked his privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. 86
Clause may apply if the act of producing a document communicates potentially incriminating
information independent of the contents of the document.").
77. Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 482 A.2d 567, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (citing United
States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310, 1310 (10th Cir. 1978)).
78. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 757 (1966)).
79. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
80. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35-36 (2000) ("[A] person may be required to
produce specific documents even though they contain incriminating assertions of fact or belief
because the creation of those documents was not 'compelled' .... ).
81. United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Bear Sterns &
Co., Inc. v. Wyler, 182 F. Supp. 2d 679, 681 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("The Fifth Amendment protects the
person asserting the privilege only from testimony that is compelled; as the preparation and
maintenance of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is involved." (citing United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984)).
82. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 391 (1976).
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The US District Court for the Southern District of Texas
refused to enforce the subpoena because the defendant, by signing the
consent forms, would be admitting to ownership of and control over
the foreign accounts.87 His act of production would be testimonial, and
therefore the Court declined to compel it.8 In response, the federal
prosecutors redrafted the consent form they had asked the defendant
to sign, so as to avoid testimonial implications stemming from
production.89 Under the new language of the consent form, the
defendant directed not only the specific target banks, but also any
bank from which he was authorized to withdraw and deposit money,
to provide relevant records to federal prosecutors in response to
subpoenas. 90 By doing so, the government hoped to remove any
information value from the consent form and, thus, negate the Fifth
Amendment issue. Again, the defendant refused to comply. 91
Ultimately, the US Supreme Court concluded that the new
consent forms were so carefully drafted that the defendant's act of
production would not be incriminating. 92  Moreover, the Court
concluded that the consent forms were not sufficiently "testimonial" so
as to fall within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment, because they did
not "relate a factual assertion or disclose information."93 Because the
defendant did not specify to which banks he was directing his consent,
87. Id. at 203-04.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 204-05. The revised consent form read:
I, _ , of the State of Texas in the United States of America, do hereby
direct any bank or trust company at which I may have a bank account of any kind or
at which a corporation has a bank account of any kind upon which I am authorized to
draw, and its officers, employees and agents, to disclose all information and deliver
copies of all documents of every nature in your possession or control which relate to
said bank account to Grand Jury 84-2, empaneled May 7, 1984 and sitting in the
Southern District of Texas, or to any attorney of the District of Texas, or to any
attorney of the United States Department of Justice assisting said Grand Jury, and to
give evidence relevant thereto, in the investigation conducted by Grand Jury 84-2 in
the Southern District of Texas, and this shall be irrevocable authority for so doing.
This direction has been executed pursuant to that certain order of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued in connection with the
aforesaid investigation, dated . This direction is intended to apply to the
Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law of the Cayman Islands, and to any
implied contract of confidentiality between Bermuda banks and their customers which
may be imposed by Bermuda common law, and shall be construed as consent with
respect thereto as the same shall apply to any of the bank accounts for which I may be
a relevant principal.
Id. at 204 n.2 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 201.
92. Id. at 216.
93. Id. at 210.
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the government was not compelling him to disclose the bank he had
used, and no testimonial information was revealed. 94
Justice Stevens filed a dissent, in which he noted that:
A defendant can be compelled to produce material evidence that is incriminating.
Fingerprints, blood samples, voice exemplars, handwriting specimens, or other items of
physical evidence may be extracted from a defendant against his will. But can he be
compelled to use his mind to assist the prosecution in convicting him of a crime? I think
not. He may in some cases be forced to surrender a key to a strongbox containing
incriminating documents, but I do not believe he can be compelled to reveal the
combination to his wall safe-by word or deed.
9 5
B. Recent Developments
Only three US courts have encountered the specific question of
whether the Fifth Amendment protects a computer password. These
courts reached opposing conclusions.
In United States v. Kirschner, a federal grand jury participated
in an investigation of the defendant for three counts of felony
possession of child pornography. 96  The defendant's use of
password-encrypted files frustrated the investigation. 9 7  The
prosecutors subpoenaed the defendant to testify before the grand jury,
and asked him to reveal the password that would decrypt the contents
of the files.98 The defendant declined, and filed a motion to quash the
subpoena invoking his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.9 9
The US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
characterized the issue as "whether requiring the Defendant to
provide the password is a testimonial communication."100 The court
noted that, in Doe, the US Supreme Court had defined a testimonial
act to occur any time "the accused is forced to reveal his knowledge of
facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts
and beliefs with the government."101 The district court also carefully
noted that, in Doe, the revised form offered by the government was
carefully tailored not to reveal any facts or convey information to the
government. 102
94. Id. at 215.
95. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).





100. Id. at *3.
101. Id. (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988)).
102. Id.
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In the case at bar, however, the court concluded that the
compelled disclosure of a password, unlike the form offered in Doe,
communicated knowledge to the government and was therefore a
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 103 The Court went on to assert that
"even if the government provides Defendant with immunity with
regard to the act of producing the password to the grand jury, that
does not suffice to protect Defendant's invocation of his Fifth
Amendment privilege in response to questioning that would require
him to reveal his password." 104  On this basis, it quashed the
government's subpoena. 10 I
The District Court for the District of Vermont reached a
different conclusion in In re Boucher.106 In that case, a border patrol
officer stopped the defendant at the Canadian border and searched his
computer. 107 The border patrol officer found over 40,000 pornographic
images, many of which the officer suspected to be child pornography.
He seized the computer and federal prosecutors charged the defendant
with possession of child pornography.108
Further investigation revealed that the child pornography was
password protected. 109 Thus, an investigating grand jury subpoenaed
the defendant to reveal his password, or an unencrypted version of his
hard drive. 110 The defendant refused to comply with the subpoena,
and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.111 The government
appealed.112
The court noted that there was "no question that the contents
of the laptop were voluntarily prepared or compiled and are not
testimonial, and therefore do not enjoy Fifth Amendment
protection."113  Moreover, the court observed that because the
government was able to connect the defendant to the laptop without
using his production of the unencrypted files as evidence of ownership,
his act of production claim was moot. 1 1 4 The defendant was therefore
required to produce an unencrypted copy of the laptop's hard drive.111
103. Id.
104. Id. at *4.
105. Id.
106. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
107. Id.
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *1.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id. at *3.
115. Id. at *4.
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Most recently, in United States v. Fricosu the US District Court
for the District of Colorado was confronted with a similar situation.116
There, like in Boucher, the government sought a writ to compel the
defendant to produce an unencrypted version of the
password-protected hard drive seized from her home. 117 Data found
on the computer confirmed that it belonged to the defendant, and, in
any event, the government offered her immunity for producing the
unencrypted data.118 On this basis, the court found that the act of
production doctrine did not apply.119 The court then observed that, as
in Boucher, the government had only requested a copy of the
unencrypted data on Fricosu's computer, as opposed to the actual
password that the government requested in Kirschner.120 Under the
Fisher doctrine, the court held that the government's request for
preexisting unencrypted documents, and not for the defendant's
password, raised no Fifth Amendment concerns.121 It therefore
granted the government's request.122
C. Analysis of the Recent Developments
In Kirschner, the district court refused to allow the government
to enforce a subpoena for the defendant's password because, according
to that court, the password itself was testimonial.123 This conclusion
suffers from several defects.
First, the district court's holding that a password is testimonial
ignores the reality that a password, like the document it protects, was
created by the defendant. 124 Moreover, the password was written
down and stored on the computer itself.125 Thus, under Fisher, the
government should be able to compel the defendant to produce the
116. United States v. Fricosu, No. 10-cr-00509-REB-02, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11083,
at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2012).
117. Id. at *16.
118. Id. at *10-12.
119. Id. at *13-14.
120. Id. at *8-10.
121. Id. at *6-7, *11-12.
122. Id. at *13.
123. United States v. Kirschner, No. 09-MC-50872, 2010 WL 1257355, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 30, 2010).
124. Phillip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 171, 195-97. Philip Reitinger observes that the encryption key is stored along with the
encrypted data. Id. Unlike the encrypted data, however, the key is not scrambled. Id. Thus, he
argues, producing the encryption key does not compel a defendant to create new and inculpatory
material, merely to disclose data that he has already created. Id. Using the encryption key, the
government can decrypt the protected information without the defendant's assistance. Id.
125. Id. at 204-05 ("[Blecause the key is stored on the computer, albeit in encrypted form,
the government may subpoena it .... ).
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passwords. 126 If courts accept the premise that courts can compel
defendants to produce documents that already exist, then their
password, which they created and which is stored on their computers,
is just such a document, and the court can compel its disclosure.
Second, the very premise that a password is "testimonial" is
flawed. Many computers use biometric information-for example, a
fingerprint, a voiceprint, or facial recognition-in lieu of a password. 127
It is well settled that this type of information is outside the ambit of
the Fifth Amendment. 128 Compelling some defendants to surrender
their "passwords" in the form of a fingerprint, but allowing others to
keep an alphanumeric password secret, creates an arbitrary
distinction 29 in a way that ignores the purpose of the Fifth
Amendment's important protections. 130  The rationale of Kirschner's
holding, therefore, does not provide a good model for a general rule
with respect to compelled production of encrypted data.
In Boucher, unlike Kirschner, the government chose to
circumvent the defendant's password altogether: Instead of requesting
that the defendant produce his password, the government simply
demanded an unencrypted copy of the protected data. 131  This
approach avoided the concerns raised by the dissent in Doe I about
compelling defendants to surrender the combination to a safe,132 and
126. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1976).
127. Aaron M. Clemens, Note, No Computer Exception to the Constitution: The Fifth
Amendment Protects Against Compelled Production of an Encrypted Document or Private Key,
2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2 n.149 ("[Bloth the governmental and private sectors are making
extensive use of biometrics to provide better service to the public." (alteration in original)
(quoting John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns-
Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PiT'r. L. REV. 97, 97-98 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
128. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1973) (compelling production of voice
exemplars does not violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (compelling production of handwriting exemplars does
not violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (compelling blood test does not violate the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination); see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 555 (1983) (admitting into
evidence a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test does not violate the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination).
129. "[I]t may not be prudent to so closely analogize encryption keys to safe combinations
given that non-privileged biometric data can be used in the place of a password. Should the
protection afforded encrypted files depend on this choice of encryption keys? What would justify
such a distinction?" Colarusso, supra note 15, at 85 (footnote omitted).
130. The Supreme Court "has often found . . . that the privilege recognizes the
unseemliness, the insult to human dignity, created when a person must convict himself out of his
own mouth. 'At its core, the privilege reflects our fierce unwillingness to subject those suspected
of crime to the cruel [choice] of self-accusation, perjury or contempt."' United States v. Balsys,
524 U.S. 666, 713 (1998) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990)).
131. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
132. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 221 (1988).
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the trial court ultimately endorsed it.13 3  There are, however,
drawbacks to this approach as well.
First, a subpoena for the deciphered contents of an entire
computer hard drive is likely overbroad." 4 Indeed, the majority of the
files on any computer hard drive will usually be irrelevant to a
criminal prosecution. 135 The hard drive subpoenaed in Boucher, for
instance, was likely filled mostly with files used by the operating
system, applications such as Word and Excel, and innocuous user-
created content such as documents and spreadsheets.13 6 Thus, a
subpoena that demands the contents of an entire hard drive, like the
subpoena in the Boucher case, requests mostly irrelevant data and
risks getting quashed.137 The issue of breadth was not raised in In Re
Boucher, but this issue still remains.
Moreover, as McGregor notes, unlike documents in a safe, a
readable version of the protected data ceases to exist when it is
encrypted. 138 In place of legible data-a document, a photograph, or a
video, for instance-the protected device holds machine code that is,
without the encryption key, meaningless.139 The meaningless data
ceases to exist when it is deciphered, and the original document is
created and stored in its place.140 Thus, unless the defendant keeps an
unencrypted copy of the data in another location, compelling his
production of an unencrypted copy compels him to "create"
incriminating data in violation of the private papers doctrine. 141
133. Id.
134. It is, of course, well settled that subpoenas must request specific things that are
relevant to the case at hand. See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, No. 10-5150, 2011 WL
3805759, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011) ("We have reviewed the subpoenas in this case, and we
easily conclude that they are overbroad and unspecific. The district court properly found that
McDonald was using the subpoenas to engage in a fishing expedition, and we find no error in the
court's granting of the motion to quash.").
135. Wayne Jekot, Computer Forensics, Search Strategies, and the Particularity
Requirement, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 2, 1 42 (2007). Since many computers share common
operating systems and applications-such as Windows, Word, Excel, and Powerpoint-the files
associated with those programs can be recognized by forensic programs like EnCase and ignored.
Id.
136. See id.
137. It is hornbook law that subpoenas must request specific things that are relevant to
the case at hand. See, e.g., McDonald, 2011 WL 3805759, at *2.
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D. Analysis of Alternative Approaches
Other authors have argued that courts should extend
constitutional protection to encrypted data based on the function of
the protection, and not its technical methodology. 14 2 In other words,
these authors argue that a defendant who chooses to store and encrypt
child pornography on his computer is entitled to no greater protection
than if he had locked it in a safe. 14 3 Affording special legal protection
to encryption, these authors suggest, provides a windfall to computer
users that does not correspond to the doctrinal basis of the Fifth
Amendment.144
There is an intrinsic appeal to the function-over-method
approach. It relies on analogies to existing technologies that are
familiar to the courts1 4 5 and, importantly, it rejects the notion that
encryption creates a safe haven for dangerous contraband like child
pornography. 14 6 Nevertheless, this approach is likely to be impractical
to implement.
First, Doe II makes clear that, under some circumstances, the
method by which even a real-world safe is secured can affect the
government's access to the protected contents within. 1 4 7  Several
jurisdictions have adopted this reasoning and have concluded that the
methodology of encryption can have constitutional ramifications. 148
Thus, although intellectually appealing, the function-over-method
approach may be difficult to apply in practice.
Moreover, there is broad agreement in academic literature that
the analogy between computer encryption and real-world safeguards
is a false one. 149 And, although courts have been quick to analogize
142. Reitinger, supra note 124, at 175-76.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. "Courts naturally and necessarily turn to analogical reasoning to incorporate cyber-
technologies into existing doctrinal rules." Luke M. Milligan, Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check
on Emerging Technologies, 80 MISS. L.J. 1319, 1338 (2011).
146. McGregor, supra note 17, at 599 ("[P]roperly implemented, a strong encryption
regime provides near absolute privacy.").
147. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even in
Stevens's dissent, he acknowledges that defendants can be forced to "surrender a key to a
strongbox containing incriminating documents ..... Id. This distinction was adopted in a later
majority opinion. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000).
148. United States v. Green, 272 F.3d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 2001); see, e.g., United States v.
Kirschner, No. 09-MC-50872, 2010 WL 1257355, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2010); see also
Commonwealth v. Burgess, 688 N.E.2d 439, 449 n.6 (Mass. 1997).
149. Milligan, supra note 145, at 1338 ("Courts naturally and necessarily turn to
analogical reasoning to incorporate cyber-technologies into existing doctrinal rules. . . . Such
reasoning, however, is indeterminate, undisciplined, and in disregard of the subtleties of
landmark cases . . . ."); McGregor, supra note 17, at 602 ("[The safe analogy fails to capture the
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encryption to wall safes, 150 they have also, on occasion, been willing to
accept that computers are a sui generis category of constitutional
searches.151 Judge Kozinski's concurrence in theUS Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit case, Comprehensive Drug Testing, for example,
recognizes that computers contain immense amounts of personal data
and argues that they should be subject to unique Fourth Amendment
requirements. 152 The bulk of commentators agree; 153 therefore, an
investigative strategy that treats encrypted data like documents in a
safe will be unsuccessful.
Andrew Ungberg proposes another approach.154 He agrees that
computers are a novel constitutional object, and therefore suggests a
unique approach to computer searches that blends the Fourth and
Fifth Amendment concerns discussed above.155 Specifically, he
suggests that all searches of encrypted data begin with a search
warrant that specifies-with particularity-the data sought. 156 If the
warrant is issued, the police can then subpoena the defendant's
password, which the court will (presumably) compel. 15 7 Once the data
is decrypted, the police will only be authorized to search the computer
for the data listed in the warrant. 15 8 Ungberg suggests that if police
discovered "evidence of a crime about which they had no knowledge,
[the defendant would be] immunized from prosecution because the
agents have no right to use evidence not specified in the warrant."159
By limiting computer searches to the subject of a pre-obtained
warrant, Ungberg's protocol strikes a laudable balance between the
government's compelling interest in finding evidence of
crime-particularly dangerous contraband such as child
pornography-and a defendant's privacy interest. However, his
proposal that police should never be permitted to seize unanticipated
contraband found during the course of a warranted search ignores the
plain view exception discussed above. While several commentators
have questioned the viability of the plain view exception as applied to
essence of encryption."); see Ungberg, supra note 17, at 548 ("A hard drive is not simply a locked
box full of documents. Encryption is neither a bank nor a safe." (footnote omitted)).
150. See Kirschner, 2010 WL 1257355, at *3.
151. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1178-79
(Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
152. Id.
153. McGregor, supra note 17; Smith, supra note 18; Ungberg, supra note 17.
154. Ungberg, supra note 17.
155. Id. at 556-58.
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computer searches,160 there is no principled reason why courts should
abandon it simply because the data searched is compulsorily
deciphered, particularly in situations where, as he suggests, the police
are "acting in good faith."161
In addition, Ungberg's approach may be problematic when
applied to non-computer devices such as cell phones because, as noted
above, the variety of devices used makes it difficult or impossible to
find forensic technology. 162 Whereas computers generally have only a
few distinct types of file architecture,163 cell phones have dozens.164
Accordingly, while it is relatively simple for forensic technicians to
obtain the tools and software necessary to image, sort, and search
computers,165 doing so for every cell phone make and model is not a
practical solution for most police departments. Penalizing law
enforcement for a general search of a cell phone-a search procedure
that current technology makes necessary-ignores the prophylactic
purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter law enforcement
misconduct, not to reward clever defendants.166
Additionally, Ungberg's proposal that police subpoena the
defendant's password, as opposed to the underlying data, is one that
was rejected in Kirschner167 and treated negatively in dicta in
160. See generally, Moshirnia, supra note 41; Saylor, supra note 41; Weir, supra note 41.
161. Ungberg, supra note 17, at 558.
162. See generally Bar-Gill, supra note 67, at 60.
163. Jekot, supra note 135.
164. See Wayne Jansen et al., Overcoming Impediments to Cell Phone Forensics, HAW.
INT'L CONF. ON Sys. Sci., Jan. 16, 2008, available at http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get-pdf.
cfm?pubid=51264; see also WAYNE JANSEN & RICK AYERS, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
GUIDELINES ON CELL PHONE FORENSICS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (2007). The distinctions between cell phones, moreover, unlike the
distinctions between computer brands, are as much a function of hardware as they are of
software. See sources cited supra note 164. Different service providers-such as AT&T, T-Mobile,
Sprint-Nextel, and Verizon-each require manufacturers to deploy different technologies when
building what is branded as an identical phone. See sources cited supra note 164. It is for this
reason that users often cannot change service providers and keep their original handset. See
sources cited supra note 164. Indeed, as the top shelf of many of our closets can attest, even the
cables that handsets accept vary from phone to phone, making physical connectivity a real
problem. See sources cited supra note 164. Moreover, individual handsets, even when they
employ substantially identical hardware, can be operated with radically different software. See
sources cited supra note 164. Thus, the file system architecture of the iPhone is not compatible
with software designed to work with phones that run Google's Android operating system, or with
Palm OS, webOS, Windows Mobile, or Symbian. See sources cited supra note 164.
165. David D. Thomas, Note, Dangerously Sidestepping the Fourth Amendment: How
Courts Are Allowing Third-Party Consent to Bypass Warrants for Searching Password-Protected
Computers, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 279, 289-90 (2009). The industry standard software package is
currently EnCase. Id. at 289.
166. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 251 (1973).
167. See generally United States v. Kirschner, No. 09-MC-50872, 2010 WL 1257355 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 30, 2010).
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Fricosu.168 Therefore, although compelled production of a computer
password is technologically indistinguishable from compelled
production of encrypted data,169 it is a procedure that needlessly risks
suppression based on the Kirschner and Fricosu decisions.
The best approach would be to couple a warrant-made
expressly subject to the practical limitations of the particularity
requirement 70-with a subpoena to produce an unencrypted copy of
the protected hard drive. By subpoenaing the data, as opposed to the
password, the government would employ a procedure that two courts
have already endorsed as constitutional. 171 When the act of producing
the data is incriminating in itself, the government can offer the
defendant use immunity. 172 If the amount of data on the device makes
production of an unencrypted copy overbroad, the court can limit
production in its discretion. 173 In that way, the defendant is protected
against a general search in a principled manner: The police will only
have access to the data specified by warrant.
However, this proposal suffers from the inherent flaw that all
schemes for compelled production of a password share: It relies on the
168. See generally United States v. Fricosu, No. 10-cr-00509-REB-02, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11083 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2012).
169. Reitinger, supra note 124, at 203-04.
170. Jansen et al., supra note 164. Specifically, the warrant must acknowledge that
some devices-such as phones-are not susceptible to the kind of forensic examination that
computer hard drives routinely undergo. Id.
171. In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *1 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
McGregor's complaint that deciphering encrypted data may rise to the level of "creating"
inculpating evidence was not addressed by the Boucher court. Id. It seems unlikely, moreover,
that it will be adopted because, taken to its logical conclusion, its result would harm defendants:
if defendants concede that deciphering encrypted data is, in fact, a creative process, then courts
must conclude that the defendant has "created" child pornography every time he himself
deciphers his encrypted data. Because the mandatory minimum for creating child pornography is
so much higher than possession, as is true for most possession crimes, it seems unlikely that
defendants will embrace McGregor's analysis.
172. Reitinger, supra note 124 (noting use immunity is now routinely used as a tool to
compel production of encryption passwords).
173. Ordering the defendant to produce an unencrypted copy of the protected data seems,
at first blush, to be ordering the fox to guard the henhouse. Ordering him to sort the data on his
hard drive and hand over only the subpoenaed directories or file types seems worse. Usually,
though, the only copy of the data is the encrypted copy. Even if the defendant routinely backed
up the data on his protected device, the backup copy would be stripped of important metadata
like the date the files were created and last accessed. Thus, ordering a defendant to produce an
unencrypted copy of a seized hard drive is really an order that he decrypt the copy already in
police possession. Given this reality, there is no opportunity for defendants to tamper with
incriminating data when they decrypt the hard drive in police custody; presumably, the police
will have a forensic technician present at the time the defendant enters his password, and can
ensure that the protected data is not altered. Similarly, where a defendant is ordered to hand
over just a few files or directories, a forensic technician can ensure that he fully complies with
the terms of the subpoena. The danger, already minimal, could be reduced still more if a court
ordered the defendant's attorney to comply with the subpoena on his behalf.
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defendant to comply with a court order to produce incriminating data.
Because receipt of a single image depicting minors engaging in
"sexually explicit conduct" will result in a minimum sentence of five
years, 17 4 many defendants with similar contraband may find criminal
contempt to be a preferable alternative.
III. A THIRD COMPONENT: THE MISSING WITNESS INSTRUCTION
As mentioned above, both the incentives to the defendant and
the cost to the government of noncompliance with subpoenas in this
context are high. Therefore, an additional legal mechanism should be
implemented. Criminal contempt is one sanction that courts have
used in the past but many defendants may find criminal contempt
preferable to a police investigation of their computer or device.175 A
more effective sanction is a missing evidence instruction.
Missing witness instructions are not novel. Today, when
evidence or a potential witness is available to only one of the parties,
and the evidence is likely to be material and not cumulative, then,
provided the party fails to produce the evidence or witness through
bad faith, the court may instruct the jury to draw an inference that
the missing evidence or testimony would have been unfavorable. 1 7 6
Where applicable, this instruction is equally available to both the
government and the defense.17 7
The benefit of a missing witness instruction, used in
conjunction with an order compelling a defendant to provide his
password or an unencrypted copy of the protected data, is twofold.
First, in cases where prosecution is completely foreclosed by the
absence of the encrypted data, a jury instruction permits the
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 provides for a five to twenty-five years' imprisonment for
defendants who receive or distribute child pornography via a computer.
175. See supra pp. 254-57.
176. An adverse inference drawn from the destruction of records is predicated on bad
conduct. United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 156 (5th Cir. 2000); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson,
756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The prevailing rule is that bad faith destruction of a
document relevant to proof of an issue at trial gives rise to a strong inference that production of
the document would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction.");
Commonwealth v. Chapman, 386 A.2d 994, 1005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (instructing trial court to
give missing evidence instruction where Commonwealth destroyed tangible evidence prior to
defendant's retrial); see also Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 790 F.2d 874, 878 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ("If a court finds that both conditions precedent, evidence destruction and bad faith, are
met, it may then infer that the evidence would be unfavorable to the destroying party if
introduced in court.").
177. See United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 318 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("The
prosecution might even claim the benefit of a 'missing evidence' instruction if Crowder declined
to permit the surgical excision."); see also Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 658 A.2d 395, 398 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) (affirming trial court's missing witness instruction where defendant failed to
call her husband to testify at DUI trial).
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prosecution to continue. In this way, it deprives the defendant of the
unfair advantage he derives from encryption, and allows the
prosecution a constructive method to see inside encryption that it
cannot otherwise break.
Second, like the particularity requirement of a warrant, a
missing evidence instruction limits the presumption to specific
evidence that there is reason to believe exists on the defendant's
computer. Thus, although the instruction acts like a constructive
search, it does not open the defendant's hard drive up to a "general,
exploratory rummaging."178
There is good reason, moreover, to believe that defendants will
fear a missing witness instruction more than contempt. This is so
because missing witness instructions have a strong influence on
juries.179 In light of that influence, noncomplying defendants will risk
not just the-relatively minor-punishment of contempt, but also the
severe penalties that accompany conviction. Thus, defendants who
would otherwise refuse to comply with a subpoena may, instead,
produce the requested data when confronted with the possibility of a
missing witness instruction.180
IV. CONCLUSION
Encryption offers a safe haven for cyber thieves, Internet
stalkers, and child predators. Without a legal mechanism to compel
defendants to decipher the data on protected devices, these criminals
will escape prosecution to the detriment of victims and society.
The current strategies invoked by prosecutors to compel
defendants to hand over encrypted data are insufficient. Where
prosecutors have demanded defendants' passwords, court have
quashed their subpoenas. 181 And although prosecutors have
successfully demanded the production of the deciphered data itself-at
least on one occasion-this procedure risks getting quashed for
overbreadth, and thus will not pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny in
many circuits. 182 Worse still, both techniques assume that defendants
178. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
179. Robert Stier, for instance, suggests that the instruction is too powerful and should
be discarded entirely. Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference-Quieting
the Loud Voice from the Empty Chair, 44 MD. L. REV. 137, 175-76 (1985).
180. John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621,
1653 (2010) (referring to the missing witness instruction as a deterrent to bad conduct).
181. See generally United States v. Kirschner, No. 09-MC-50872, 2010 WL 1257355 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 30, 2010).
182. See generally United States v. McDonald, No. 10-5150, 2011 WL 3805759, at *2 n.*
(4th Cir. Aug. 30, 2011).
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will comply with court orders and hand over data that will almost
certainly result in convictions and decades of imprisonment.
One approach that avoids all of these dangers is for courts to
issue subpoenas for the deciphered data with a warrants that specify
what and how to search. If the defendant refuses to produce the
deciphered data, the court can hold him in contempt.
However, this too, is incomplete. Warrants and subpoenas are
some of the useful tools by which to ask defendants to decipher their
protected data, but they are not fail safe. On the contrary, defendants
may well prefer contempt to compliance, where handing over
protected data almost certainly will result in a lengthy prison
sentence.
Ultimately, the necessary legal mechanism that allows
fact-finders to look into protected data is a missing evidence
instruction; if the combination of a warrant, a subpoena, and contempt
cannot induce a defendant to decrypt his data, the court must issue an
instruction that the fact-finder may presume the missing data to be
incriminating. Such an instruction does not open a defendant's
computer or electronic device to search, and does not compel him to
provide incriminating testimony. Nevertheless, by doing so, the legal
system will defeat a criminal's technological advantage and offer
justice to his victims.
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